AI tools like Claude are reshaping the attack surface in ways traditional vulnerability management can’t track. Here’s what security teams need to know.

AI is steadily becoming the gateway that leads to an ever-expanding attack surface. Before easy-to-use AI tools such as Claude and ChatGPT arrived, the vulnerability team had three main jobs. It tracked which software was deployed where, patched vulnerabilities when they were discovered, and hardened deployments to secure the environment ahead of an attack.
This methodology is primarily dependent on asset management and software tracking combined with version information. And in most environments, the model works like this: If it’s the impacted version, then patch; if it’s not, no current action needed. Over the years, we have learned that even this basic model feels insurmountable at times, even with the best asset data and a realistic way to calculate risk.
Enter the modern implementation of AI: end-user tools that combine ease of use with ease of access. Risk is no longer visible in which version is installed. AI workflow vulnerabilities and risk depend completely on the end user and how they interact with a given platform, and a CPE or asset inventory cannot observe or classify that.
In this blog post, we will explain the latest feature sets of Claude, one of the most popular suites in this new class of AI from Anthropic. Specifically, we will discuss end-user features in the Windows version of Claude Cowork and how using them expands your attack surface. Then we will walk through recent proof-of-concept (PoC) research that shows Claude and Claude Cowork can be exploited.
AI has been around for some time. Only in the last few years have end users had interfaces this easy to reach, such as chats and prompts. These are tools they likely use in their personal lives and want to bring to the office to make their work lives more efficient. Organizations seem to be taking one of two approaches to this new technology. Some block all things AI and fall behind as a result. Others take the more dangerous option: they allow its use in their environment without understanding the risk they’ve accepted.
Claude was originally released to the general public on March 14, 2023, as a “next-generation AI assistant based on Anthropic’s research into training helpful, honest, and harmless AI systems.” (https://www.anthropic.com/news/introducing-claude) Since then, it has made massive strides. Below are the releases we consider most notable for attack surface:1 2

Between February 2025 and February 2026, there have been 14 features that have either been introduced or improved that enable inherent risk. When concerning risk for any organization, that is monumental, especially given that most TPRM teams don’t reevaluate risk on an annual basis. This means that someone who signed off on the risk of Claude in 2025 likely doesn’t know about this expanding attack surface, yet the acceptance still exists.
To understand the risk you’re accepting, learn how a given tool operates and how to detect its presence in the environment. Most importantly, find out what logging is available for responders and engineers. Anthropic publishes documentation and safe-use guidance 3 4. Most of the recommendations are vague, though, and assume the end user can tell what is good and bad in the context of Claude.
At Spektion, we are dedicated to documenting how things operate, so we’ve highlighted key binaries and logging related to Claude Cowork and Claude in Chrome below.
Even though it isn’t discussed very often, Claude has a pretty thorough logging capability. If you are operating in an environment that has the capability to do so, we recommend sending the files found within the following log locations to your central logging platform:
Cowork makes interacting with Claude a lot easier, taking the work out of the CLI and moving it into a new tab in the Desktop application. Outlined below are the available named pipes, executables, and log locations.
Named Pipe(s):
Log Location:
cowork-svc.exe
Claude Cowork operates in the context of multiple vhdx (virtual hard drive) files and Linux binaries to achieve its segmentation from the host operating system. These are mounted out of the claudevm.bundle folder path that exists at “C:\Users\User\AppData\Roaming\Claude\vm_bundles\claudevm.bundle\”.
VM bundle
ID (owner): cowork-vm


Claude in Chrome works by interacting with a native messaging host on the device, made possible by chrome-native-host.exe and an extension installed in a supported browser.
Example log:
[2026-03-05 19:10:09 INFO chrome-native-host] Chrome native host starting (version 0.1.0)
[2026-03-05 19:10:09 INFO chrome-native-host] Creating Windows named pipe: \\.\pipe\claude-mcp-browser-bridge-User
[2026-03-05 19:10:09 INFO chrome-native-host] Named pipe created successfully
[2026-03-05 19:10:09 INFO chrome-native-host] Pipe name: \\.\pipe\claude-mcp-browser-bridge-User
[2026-03-05 19:10:09 INFO chrome-native-host] Entering main message loop
[2026-03-05 19:10:09 INFO chrome-native-host] Socket server listening for connections
Example of what the end user sees in their Cowork session:



With full access to the internet, it is easy to picture what an attack would look like and what it would achieve. We have mapped one scenario out below:
Stage 1: Initial Access
Stage 2: Agent Context Injection
Stage 3: Cross-Domain Escalation
Stage 4: File System Execution (Cowork Layer)
Stage 5: Persistence and lateral movement
Putting this all together, we’ve highlighted recent scenarios of this theoretical attack scenario playing out in Cowork, Claude Desktop, and Claude.
promptarmor.com/resources/claude-cowork-exfiltrates-files
Indirect prompt injection is an attack in which instructions hidden in content the model reads, such as a website or a file, change what the model does. OWASP covers it under LLM01:2025 Prompt Injection.
In this attack chain, an unsuspecting end-user uploads files (via Cowork folder usage) that contain a hidden prompt injection within a skill the user downloaded from the internet. Once uploaded, the end user attempts to use the skill to analyze the documents in the Cowork folder. Instead of analyzing the files, the injected prompt exfiltrates a confidential document to a threat actor's Anthropic account using the files API.
How to detect it:
akamai.com/blog/claude-desktop-extensions-rce
In this PoC, the researcher tricked the Google Calendar MCP into executing code on the local system. This is possible because the MCP server has host-level access, and the calendar invite included instructions to pull code from a remote repository and run its make file. The initial prompt was vague (“then take care of it for me”), so Claude chose the appropriate plugin and next steps on its own. Akamai, which acquired LayerX, the company behind the research, reports that the flaw earned a CVSS score of 10/10.
How to detect it:
In this blog, we explained how Claude and Claude Cowork help with efficiency and technical delivery and also open another pathway to an expanded attack surface. These are tools that don’t follow the traditional paths of version control, risk appetite, or feature hardening. Additionally, we dove a little deeper to identify how the tools work under the hood, behind the scenes of what your end user sees, and what common tools detect. We also highlighted how difficult it is to keep up with the pace of this ever-changing, ever-expanding suite of tools. Finally, we highlighted recent examples of how threat actors benefit from Claude's efficiencies and how researchers are raising the alarm about the vulnerabilities they continually discover in Claude.
1 https://support.claude.com/en/articles/12138966-release-notes
2 https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/release-notes/overview
3 https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13345190-get-started-with-claude-cowork
4https://support.claude.com/en/articles/13364135-use-claude-cowork-safely
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